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I.

INTRODUCTION

‘International law is a legal system.’ Thus begins the first of 42 conclusions formulated
by the ILC Study Group on the fragmentation of international law. 1 The sentence is more
a postulate than an actual conclusion, and a disputed one at that. After all, much of the
current discussion on the fragmentation of international law is motivated precisely by the
suspicion that international law might actually not be a system, at least not an internally
coherent one the way we think of domestic legal systems. The Study Group thus
postulates an answer to an ontological question – whether international law actually is a
system – in order to answer the technical question of how to deal with conflicts and
interrelation between its rules.
This is difficult enough for the kind of conflicts that the report identifies as the
most relevant ones: conflicts between ‘principles that may often point in different
directions … new types of treaty clauses or practices that may not be compatible with old
general law or the law of some other specialized branch’. 2 The discovery of Multisource
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Equivalent Norms (MSEN) 3 suggests that the challenge is even more fundamental: even
where rules in different regimes do not point in different directions, the question which of
them is applicable remains. This suggests that the fragmentation of international law does
not only imply a plurality of values; it also implies a plurality of techniques.
The assumption for many participants in the debate, what we call here the
ontological question – whether international law is a coherent system – has not only
technical but predominantly normative implications, or is even itself, really, a normative
question. There exists a widespread normative preference for coherence over
fragmentation, order over disorder, system over plurality. We do not go so far as to claim
that the question of whether international law is a coherent system or not is normatively
irrelevant. However, we do think that its normative implications are overrated, and that
the main problems with fragmentation are technical, not normative, in nature. If the
resolution of conflicts were only possible within a coherent system, then the question of
whether international law is such a system would have direct normative implications. If,
by contrast, it could be shown that conflicts can be resolved also in the absence of one
coherent system, then what looked like a normative question would become a technical
one: the prime question is then which of different types of technical rules we have to
apply to deal with the conflict.
The ILC report rightly points out that, in order to deal with fragmentation, ‘it is
useful to have regard to the wealth of techniques in the traditional law’. 4 The rules it
refers to, and limits its inquiry to, are rules concerning conflicts within a legal system. We
refer to this approach as ‘conflict of norms’, with reference to the title and type of
analysis conducted by one of us in an earlier book. 5 These rules are rules on hierarchical
relations, presumptions of statutory interpretation, and principles of balancing (eg on how
different rules within Belgian law interrelate). Use of these rules appears to presuppose
that international law is a system comparable to a domestic legal system. Indeed, it
appears scholars often want to see international law as a system (rather than a pluralist or
fragmented agglomeration) in part because this makes it possible to apply traditional
3
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conflict-of-norms rules (such as the principles of lex posterior or lex specialis). When the
report of the ILC Study Group discusses ideas of legal pluralism, for example, it does so
with the concern that such pluralism will be incompatible with the systematic approach
and the rules on conflict of norms it encompasses. 6 Its main author, Martti Koskenniemi,
has elsewhere expressed his normative concerns over such pluralism. 7
As a matter of fact, rules to deal with pluralism exist, and conflict-of-norms rules
are not the only set of rules for conflicts. Another set of rules in ‘traditional law’ concerns
conflicts between legal systems (which we will refer to as ‘conflict of laws’ or ‘private
international law solutions’). These rules are typically rules of domestic law that
determine which of several domestic substantive laws should apply (eg whether Belgian
or German law applies to a fact pattern), according to certain factors, for example, the
location of the object in question or the nationality of the parties.
Both sets of rules – ‘conflict-of-norms’ rules and ‘conflict-of-laws’ rules – were
traditionally developed with regard not to international law but to domestic legal systems.
Rules on hierarchical relations between rules and on systematic statutory interpretation
were created within the context of domestic legal systems. Rules on conflict of laws are
also mostly rules of domestic law (though they have at least in part been derived from
principles of international law, 8 ) but they have been applied to conflicts between the laws
of different states, not to conflicts between different treaties. Such conflict-of-laws rules
have occasionally been considered for public international law, too. In 1953, Wilfred
Jenks argued that ‘some of the problems which [conflicts of law-making treaties] involve
may present a closer analogy with the problem of the conflict of laws than with the

6

Koskenniemi Report, (n 2) para 488 (p 247).
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought’ (2005)
www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d%5B1%5D.pdf (p 20-21). A more positive
assessment of such International Law pluralism is offered in David Kennedy, ‘One, Two, Three Many
Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream’ (2007) 3 New York University Review for Law
and Social Change 641. See, more generally, Ralf Michaels, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2009) 5 Annual
Review of Law and Social Science 243, 249 and passim; see also Iulia Voina-Motoc, ‘Conceptions of
Pluralism and International Law’ in Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Emmanuelle Jouannet, Vincent Tomkiewicz (eds),
Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law 401 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart,
Publishing, 2008).
8
Alex Mills, ‘The Private History of International Law’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative Law
Quarterly 1; see also Ralf Michaels, ‘Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global
Issues’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 121 with references.
7

problem of conflicting obligations within the same legal system.’ 9 Philip Jessup, in his
famous lectures on transnational law, also discussed the problem of applicable laws
before international tribunals as one of choice of law and compared it explicitly with the
task of the national judge in determining which law to apply. 10 More recently, Andreas
Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner have developed the idea that the national
differentiation of law is now overlain by a sectorial differentiation and that conflicts
between sectorial laws – regimes – must, like conflicts between national laws, be dealt
with through a system of conflict of laws. 11 One of us, in a relatively early book on the
subject, briefly considered but rejected, for the time being, a private international law
approach. 12
That said, extensive discussions of when and how a private international law
approach would actually work to resolve public international law conflicts do not exist.
Jenks discusses conflict avoidance more than conflict resolution. Jessup uses tools that
are not those of conflict of laws. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner argue that the special
character of conflicts among regimes requires the development of substantive norms,
without a satisfactory explanation as to why exactly this should be so. 13 Moreover, there
is relatively little discussion on which of these two approaches is to be preferred under
what circumstances. The reason may be that scholars writing in the field start from a
certain assumption on the ontological challenge – namely, that international law is or
should be a coherent system, or that it is not – and derive rules from that assumption.
In this article, we do not set out to place the ontological question of whether
international law is a system at the beginning of the research. Rather, we begin with a
presentation of the two different approaches and a discussion of the prerequisites for their
respective applicability (Parts II and III). We then discuss how these two approaches map
on to the discussion of fragmentation of international law, without actually, at this stage,
prioritizing one over the other. If anything, our claim would be that public international
law conflicts are likely sui generis, with aspects of both conflict of norms and conflict of
9
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laws, and that to resolve this type of conflicts one can learn and borrow from both
approaches (Part IV). Finally, we take on the question of what this means for the
systematic nature of international law (Part V). All through this chapter, we do not offer
a systematic analysis, but rather a number of examples to demonstrate the existence, and
usefulness, of two very different sets of conflict rules. 14
An important message of this chapter for public international lawyers is this: the
now frequently voiced unease amongst public international lawyers with traditional
conflict-of-norms rules 15 is best answered with private-international-law solutions.
Although certain traditional conflict-of-laws rules cannot be used tel quel because the
connecting factors they rely on – places, people, governmental interests – cannot be
applied to regimes, functionally refined conflict-of-laws rules promise to be more helpful.
Another core message of this chapter, targeted this time at a private international law
audience, is that conflict of laws can operate not only between the laws of states but also
to resolve public international law conflicts, but not all of them and in a contextually
adapted fashion.
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II.

INTERACTIONS WITHIN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT OF

NORMS
A.

SOLUTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW

Legal systems provide their own tools to establish their internal coherence. 16 More than
one rule may a priori be applicable to a set of facts. Institutionally, internal coherence is
established mainly through highest courts. Doctrinally, the solution lies in legal rules that
determine the relation between different norms. European law in the civil law tradition
(which historically relied less on courts to establish internal coherence procedurally) has
been particularly robust in developing a number of presumptions of statutory
interpretation to resolve conflicts between norms, but similar solutions are found in the
common law.
A first set of conflict rules acts at the level of hierarchy of norms. Thus, under the
rule of lex superior derogat legi inferiori, the hierarchically superior rule trumps the
hierarchically inferior. It is for this reason that constitutional law trumps ordinary
statutory law, which in turn trumps common law rules; mandatory rules of contract law
trump party agreements, and these agreements in turn trump subsidiary rules of contract
law.
Where no such hierarchy of sources exists and rules are enacted in the same field,
for example in contract law, a second set of conflict rules must be developed. As between
more general and more specific rules, for example, the one with the more specific scope
of application applies (lex specialis derogate lege generali). Thus, general contract law is
trumped by the specific rules on consumer contracts on the one hand or by those on
commercial contracts on the other. Under the rule of lex posterior derogat lege anterior, a
later rule is presumed to trump an earlier rule. Both lex specialis and lex posterior are
presumptions as to the intent of the lawmaker or legislator on the issue in question.
Presumably, a lawmaker, in regulating a specific area, wants to create special rules that
trump the general rules in the field. As a consequence, the presumption is that the latest
and/or most specific legislative expression matters and prevails. According to the literal
16
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rule, similar terms in different statutes are in principle presumed to have the same
meaning.
Finally, where rules with different functions are in conflict, the above, second set
of conflict rules is of limited use. For example, rules of intellectual property may conflict
with rules of antitrust law. Intellectual property rules give the owner a monopoly over a
certain intangible good, whereas antitrust law sets out to combat monopolies. Rules on
freedom of speech may conflict with rules on personal dignity. The solution in most legal
systems is one of balancing of interests, though this has frequently been criticized.
B.

PREREQUISITES

All of this is well-known. What is sometimes underappreciated is the extent to which the
above ‘conflict-of-norms’ rules work smoothly only insofar as we can assume that (i) all
legal rules in play coexist within a single overarching system and (ii) the decision which
rule to apply can be imputed, albeit by fiction, to a unitary lawmaker with a coherent
legislative intent. This is why these rules are traditionally applied within legal systems,
not between legal systems, and in a universe with a unitary lawmaker, not with many
lawmakers.
Thus, the lex superior principle requires a common system within which a
hierarchy of norms can be established; it does not function between systems. Take, for
example, the famous Yahoo! Case decided in 2000. 17 In that case, French courts decided,
essentially, that Yahoo!, a Californian company, could be banned from enabling the
auctioning of Nazi literature on its Internet auction site, even though such a ban would be
in conflict with the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Some authors have
criticized this decision with the suggestion that the conflict between a statute and a
constitutional rule must be resolved in favour of the Constitution. 18 Such reasoning
would be perfectly adequate if the conflict had arisen within one legal system, either
between the French Constitution and a French statute, or between the US Constitution
and a US statute. By contrast, where the conflict exists between a statute and a
17
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Constitution of two different legal systems (with two ‘lawmakers’ independent from each
other), the argument becomes unconvincing, because no hierarchical relation exists: the
French legislator is not subject to the requirements of the US Constitution, and the US
Constitution does not, on its own force, reach into France. This does not mean that the
French court should not have considered the US Constitution at all, nor that the status of
the US Constitution should play no role; only that the basis for this cannot be found in the
lex superior principle.
Presumptions of statutory interpretation, which work well among rules on the
same level of hierarchy within one system, are similarly dependent on the presumption of
a uniform legislator, even if this presumption is fictitious. As between legal systems, they
lose much of their plausibility. For example, the lex specialis rule is grounded in the
presumption that a legislator, in regulating a specific case, wants to carve out an
exception from the general rules existing for a set of matters. 19 As between countries or
between national laws, it is hard to make a similar presumption. The French hate speech
statute is more specific than the First Amendment, but it does not follow at all that it
should therefore take priority as an exception to the First Amendment. Similar limitations
exist for the lex posterior rule. The rule makes sense within one legal system, because the
legislator can be presumed to legislate with knowledge of prior laws and thus with
reference to those laws. This assumption is less warranted between legal systems. 20 It
seems quite implausible to argue, for example, that the US Constitution must stand back
merely because it is older than the French statute in question. Similarly, the assumption
that similar terms in different statutes have a similar meaning (the ‘literal rule’) makes
sense within one legal system that strives for internal consistency, because we can
presume that the unitary lawmaker means the same thing with similar terms. The
assumption is much harder to make between different legal systems. For example, as
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comparative lawyers have often warned us, contract in English law is not the same as
contrat in French law; 21 it is not even the same in English law as in US law.
Finally, the balancing between rules serving different functions (eg Belgian
intellectual property law versus Belgian antitrust law) is in principle linked to intrasystemic reasoning as well. Rational balancing requires an objective standard for the
respective weight of each principle to be balanced. 22 If that standard cannot be derived
from the intent of a unitary legislator, it must come from somewhere else, for example, a
uniform standard of welfare maximization. As between legal systems, the problem is that
the difference between the conflicting norms is typically a consequence of the fact that
each of the systems uses a different ‘objective standard’ to define, weigh and ultimately
balance the conflicting principles within its own system. Simplistically speaking, the US
values freedom of speech higher than the need to ban anti-Semitic speech; the result of
balancing speech and dignity within French law is different. Since balancing is a function
of the relative weight of different principles, and this relative weight may be different
within different legal systems, balancing between legal systems will often not resolve the
conflict between these different balancing results. 23 Brainerd Currie in particular, as the
inventor of the governmental interest analysis in the field of conflict of laws, opposed
such balancing between legal systems precisely for this reason, because it ignored the
policy choice made by the forum’s legislator. In his view, a judge cannot balance the
interests of its own legislator against those of another.24 Indeed, most methods of conflict
of laws (though not all) 25 oppose open balancing of interests and instead focus on the
relative strength of policies. Similarly, the idea of finding a mix between different
regimes, which Fischer-Lescano and Teubner propose for public international law
conflicts, has been proposed occasionally as a solution for traditional choice-of-law
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problems. 26 However, most conflict-of-laws approaches eschew a mixture or compromise
between different laws and instead designate either one or the other state’s law to apply.

III.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT OF

LAWS
A.

SOLUTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW

One reason, then, for why conflicts between different legal systems are governed by
different rules than are conflicts within one legal system, is that the rules developed for
intra-systemic conflict do not work well in the context of inter-systemic conflict. There is
no hierarchy between different legal systems, except for the relative hierarchy that each
system may claim for itself over others. There is no overarching system within which
rules on statutory interpretation could achieve coherence. There is no uniform legislative
intent on which the resolution could be based. There is no neutral or mutually accepted
standard under which different values could be balanced.
The alternative is not anarchy but private international law. In private international
law, several methods exist on how to resolve conflicts between legal systems. With gross
simplification, it may be appropriate to present three methods: the traditional method,
governmental interest analysis, and functional analysis. While the first two are tied to
conflicts between state laws, the third one is more promising for international law.
The first method, here called the traditional method, exists in both Europe and the
United States, with some differences that need not concern us here. 27 Under the
traditional method, the applicable law is determined on the basis of conflict-of-laws rules
designed for different areas of law in the abstract, without regard to the content of the
substantive law. Essentially, determining the applicable law is a three-step endeavour. In a
first step, the matter in question must be characterized as one of contract law, tort law,
procedure, etc, so the applicable choice-of-law rule (eg that for contract or tort) can be
determined. In a second step, application of this choice of law leads to the determination
26
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of the applicable law on the basis of a connecting factor. Most of these connecting factors
are either territorial (the place of the tort for matters of tort, the place of performance for
matters of contract law, etc.) or personal (the law of nationality or of domicile for matters
of personal status, etc.). In a third and final step, the law so determined is applied unless
its application would violate the public policy of the forum law.
A good example of this three-step analysis is provided by the Supreme Court of
Delaware in Folk v York-Shipley, which applied this inter-systemic method to a conflict
between the laws of different US states. 28 The plaintiff, a Delaware domiciliary whose
husband had died in a car collision in Pennsylvania, sued for loss of her husband’s
consortium. Such a cause of action existed in Delaware’s law but not in Pennsylvania’s
law. The court first had to characterize this issue as one of tort law (liability for a car
accident) or one of family law (injury to a marriage): a tort claim would be governed by
the law of the place of the injury, whereas a family law claim could arguably have been
governed by the law of the common spousal domicile, which was Delaware. Once the
issue was characterized as one of tort law, in a second step the place of the injury had to
be determined and was determined to be the place of the car accident (Pennsylvania), not
the place where the wife lived and where arguably her consortium was lost (Delaware). In
a third step, finally, the Delaware court determined that the law of Pennsylvania applied.
The court did not discuss, though it could have, whether Pennsylvania law should remain
inapplicable because it violated a fundamental policy of Delaware so it would.
A second approach, developed in opposition to the traditional method described
above, is called governmental interest analysis. The starting point for this method is the
‘governmental’ interest of a state in having its own law applied. Hence, the substance of
the respective laws provides the starting point of the analysis (though their respective
quality or desirability is not normally a criterion). Here, the first step is to determine
which rules of law claim applicability, in view of both their text and of whether the
respective legislative intent would be furthered by their application. If more than one
state is interested in having its law applied and their laws differ, the resulting ‘true
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conflict’ must be resolved, and various suggestions have been made for how such a
conflict can be resolved.
Perhaps the most important solution is that of ‘comparative impairment’: as
between two conflicting laws, the judge should apply the law that would be more
impaired by non-application. 29 An example can be seen in Tucci v Club Méditerranée
SA. 30 Tucci, a Californian citizen, had been injured during his employment at a vacation
camp operated by French defendant Club Méditerranée in the Dominican Republic.
Under California law, Tucci had a tort claim because Club Méditerranée had no insurance
with a company authorized in California. Under the law of the Dominican Republic, by
contrast, workers compensation was the only available remedy. The court held that the
law of the Dominican Republic established a quid pro quo between employers and
employees by giving employees easy access to compensation while shielding employers
from tort liability. This quid pro quo would be severely impaired if Tucci was granted a
tort claim under Californian law. By contrast, if the law of the Dominican Republic
applied and Tucci’s claims were limited to those under workers compensation,
California’s interest would be insignificantly impaired: California’s interest in making
sure that employees are adequately insured was fulfilled because Club Méditerranée in
fact had insurance, albeit with a French, not a Californian insurer. Except for the
insurance requirement, California provides for a quid pro quo comparable to that in the
Dominican Republic. As a result, the law of the Dominican Republic was applied. Note
that the court was not balancing policies; it balanced governmental interests.
Finally, more recent methods of conflict of laws adopt variants of a functional
perspective, even though the meaning of such a term and the method discussed under it
differ among different authors and courts. In England, this means that the court should
look for the proper law, the law most appropriate to govern the issue in question. 31 In the
United States, Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman developed a multifaceted
method to determine the applicable law on the basis of a number of factors, including the
relevant strength of the policies of the involved states, a comparative evaluation of the
29
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asserted policies, a commonly held multi-state policy, and the degree of effective control
each state has over the matter. 32 In Europe, a functional approach led not to a rejection
but a refinement of the traditional approach. 33 The three steps of the European approach
outlined above were maintained but disentangled from the idea that the applicable law
should be based on the power of the state over its territory and its citizens. In all of these
functional approaches, the search is ultimately for the most appropriate law, the law with
the closest connection to the facts, considering a variety of factors.
B.

PREREQUISITES

The above conflict-of-laws methods are quite closely linked to relations between different
legal systems. They do not function well for intra-systemic conflicts. To explain why this
is the case we must engage in a somewhat more elaborate discussion because the reasons
are slightly different for each of the approaches discussed.
The traditional method is hard to apply to intra-systemic conflicts for two reasons.
First, the approach presumes that the conflict occurs between two legal orders that are
essentially complete, insofar as each of them must have rules in the same area of law: tort
law, contract law, etc. Where, for example, the issue is characterized as one of tort law,
the conflict is between two tort laws (eg those of Pennsylvania and Delaware). Although
such situations exist also, occasionally, within legal systems (eg between general contract
law and consumer contract law), a second reason makes the traditional approach difficult
to apply to almost all intra-systemic conflicts. Under the traditional approach, the
applicable law is determined through either a territorial or a personal connecting factor,
and such factors are often absent within legal systems. 34 The distinction between general
contract law and consumer contract law, for example, cannot be made on the basis of
territorial factors because they are not territorially distinct. It can be made on the basis of
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personal factors, depending on whether one party is a consumer or not. 35 Yet other
conflicts–that between nuisance as a tort and property, for example–cannot.
Governmental interest analysis, in turn, is hard to apply to intra-systemic conflicts
for a related reason: it assumes the coexistence of two governments whose interests are in
question and potentially in conflict. As between two systems, each with its own
government, it may be possible to determine which government has the greater interest.
Within one legal system, this is impossible, as long as, at least in theory, the same
government or ‘lawmaker’ is concerned.
The relative inadequacy of conflict-of-laws approaches for intra-systemic
conflicts is no coincidence. Both the traditional method and governmental interest
analysis are catered specifically to conflicts between states. The choice of connecting
factors – territory, citizenship, governmental interests – mirrors closely the classical
definition of the state as based on three elements: a territory, a population, a government
structure. 36 In international law, by contrast, even where we can speak of different subsystems or branches of international law (say, WTO 37 law and human rights law), these
are not defined by territory or personality, and neither WTO law nor human rights law has
its own government with conceivable governmental interests, so the criteria developed in
these particular conflict-of-laws approaches are not applicable as such. Moreover, in
conflicts between states, the use of such factors makes it possible to allocate issues
among states precisely because these states resemble each other structurally and
functionally–each state displays these abstract criteria, and each state generally performs
the same functions. Within one system this method is often inapplicable because different
statutes, different sectors of the law, do not display the same structure and do not perform
the same function. If, for example, Belgian general contract law and Belgian consumer
law performed the same functions one of them would be redundant and likely abolished.
The functional approach to conflict of laws appears to be less open to such
criticism. The search for the proper law (or norm), the designation of the applicable law
(or norm) on functional grounds, appear, to some extent, to be possible regardless of
35
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whether we are within one system or between systems. Indeed, in this sense the
functional approach to inter-systemic conflicts is in many ways not so different from the
functional approach to intra-systemic conflicts discussed above. However, differences do
exist. First, in intra-systemic conflicts the focus is on balancing laws (recall the IP versus
anti-trust law example); in inter-systemic conflicts it is on balancing respective regulatory
interests (recall the notion of comparative impairment). Second, in intra-systemic
conflicts, the functional approach aims at coherence; in inter-systemic conflicts, it aims at
coordination. Third, in intra-systemic conflicts, a functional approach can lead to mixed
or compromise solutions; in inter-systemic conflicts, the aim is to maintain the internal
integrity of each system by designating one or the other, and to minimize the
consequences of frictions.

IV.

INTERACTIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Which of the above approaches is more adequate for conflicts within public international
law or for fragmented public international law? At first sight, the core question may seem
to be whether international law is more like one system or more like the combination of
several systems: if it is one system, we should use a conflict-of-norms approach; if it is a
combination of systems, we should use a private international law approach.
We do not think this is the most useful order of steps. Whether international law
behaves like a system or not is in no small part determined by the very way in which
relations between rules are handled. If we choose intra-systemic rules to govern relations
between, say, the international trade and climate change regimes, this very choice
constructs international law as a system. If we choose inter-systemic rules to address
interactions, this constructs public international law as a plurality and a uniform system
of public international law no longer emerges. This suggests, however, that we need not
start with the ontological question (Is public international law one system or not?).
Instead, we can start by addressing the pragmatic question of which rules work best for
different contexts (conflict of norms or conflict of laws?) and determine in the light of the
answers how to understand public international law.

A.

GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES

One important type of interaction between rules of international law is that between
treaties and general international law. Treaties, ratified by explicit consent by a certain
number of states, are akin to contracts or contractual regimes. For example, the WTO
treaty 38 and the Kyoto Protocol 39 are binding (only) on the states that agreed on and
ratified these treaties. General international law (to some extent akin to codes and statutes
or common law) encompasses the rules that states are ‘born into’ and that are binding on
all states irrespective of explicit consent and subject matter. For example, general
international law rules on treaty interpretation or state responsibility are by default
applicable in both the context of the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol. General international
law includes customary international law and general principles of law. To some extent, it
includes also quasi-constitutional norms, in particular, jus cogens, from which no treaty
can deviate.
For interactions and conflicts between treaties and general international law, intrasystemic conflict rules work well. The reason is simple but deserves repeating: this type
of interaction closely resembles the interaction of rules within a single legal system. If
general international law and, in particular, rules of jus cogens exist at all, they must by
necessity, in order to be general, exist within – or constitute – a legal system. Denying the
systemic character of international law implies denying the existence of general
international law. Notably, the absence of a unitary lawmaker or source of authority is no
counterargument – the unitary lawmaker is assumed as a fiction, as in Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), which refers, to the
‘international community of States’ as the creator of jus cogens. 40
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In this intra-systemic constellation, the lex superior rule as we know it within
domestic legal systems can be used for hierarchical relations. Jus cogens is then the
‘higher law’ prevailing over all other rules of the international law ‘system’. In this sense,
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that ‘[a] treaty is void if, at the time
of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law,’ states
little more than a definitional truism. This hierarchical structure – jus cogens trumps
treaties – does not, in and of itself, resolve conflicts, because it does not define whether a
given rule of general international law is jus cogens (and thus trumps treaties) or not. The
notion of hierarchy itself does not even implicate that there must be any rules of jus
cogens at all. However, it does capture that to the extent that rules belong to jus cogens,
conflicts between them and treaties are questions of hierarchy within a legal system.
Similarly, lex specialis, another intra-systemic conflict rule discussed above,
works well for interactions between general international law and specific treaties (such
as the WTO treaty). This is made explicit, eg, in Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility (generally considered part of customary international law), which
explicitly confirms, under the heading of ‘lex specialis’, that ‘[t]hese articles [ie the ILC
Draft Articles] do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence
of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law’. 41
Finally, the presumption against conflict and the principle of ‘systemic
integration’, as they are known in international law, 42 are (much like the intra-systemic
literal rule discussed earlier`) built on the premise that the legislator or specific group of
contracting states must be presumed not to want to deviate from, or contradict, an earlier
expression or rule. Again, for the intra-systemic type of interaction between general
international law and treaties this presumption fits well: we can presume that, for
example, two states that conclude a treaty did so with the background of general
international law, to which they are both bound, in mind.
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B.

CONFLICTS WITHIN ONE BRANCH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Similar considerations apply to norm relations within one branch of international law,
such as within the WTO system or within the realm of the law of the sea. 43 For example,
pursuant to Article XVI:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, this
Agreement prevails over all other agreements within the WTO – an application of the
intra-systemic lex superior principle. 44 Pursuant to the lex specialis rule, specific
agreements on trade in goods (say, Agriculture) prevail over the more general rules in the
GATT. Article 311.1 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 45
confirms the lex posterior principle when stating that ‘[t]his Convention shall prevail, as
between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April
1958.’ In these cases, it is possible to assume a fictitious WTO or UN law of the sea
‘legislator’. Granted, the actual negotiating parties change constantly – countries join and
leave treaties as the United States did with UNESCO, withdrawing in 1984 and rejoining
in 2003, or China, which left the GATT in 1950 and joined the WTO in 2001.
Nonetheless, there is still enough institutional coherence, continuity and memory to make
the fiction of a unitary lawmaker plausible.
A broader application of the intra-systemic lex posterior rule is found in Article 30
of the Vienna Convention: for parties bound by two treaties, ‘the earlier treaty applies
only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty’ (Article
30:3). Interestingly, the very title as well as paragraph 1 of Article 30 state explicitly that
this lex posterior rule applies only between ‘treaties relating to the same subject matter’.
This suggests that the rule was written mainly with intra-systemic conflicts in mind, that
is, successive treaties, within the same field or branch of international law, broadly
speaking. 46 Indeed, although the lex posterior rule has occasionally been used to resolve
43
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conflicts between two branches of international law, this creates some unease. Take
GATT: the original GATT 47 was concluded in 1947 so that the later Treaty of Rome 48 or
Montreal Protocol 49 would arguably prevail over it; yet, when GATT 1994 50 was
concluded, did this mean that GATT rules now all of a sudden trump the earlier EC
Treaty or Montreal Protocol? And that with the recent Lisbon Treaty 51 , GATT must again
give way? One way to alleviate this unease is to rank the lex specialis principle above the
lex posterior rule, so the more specific EC Treaty then prevails over GATT irrespective of
GATT’s timing. Yet, on what basis is one to decide that a treaty or specific norm is ‘more
specific’? Another option is to deny that in those situations we are talking about
successive treaties in the first place by qualifying either or both of these treaties as
‘continuing’ or ‘living’ treaties (so that Article 30, by its very terms, does not apply). 52
Another, perhaps easier, explanation follows from our discussion earlier: Article 30 and
lex posterior should presumptively not apply to interactions between different branches
of international law because those interactions are more akin to inter-systemic conflict, a
type of conflict not well-suited for application of the lex posterior principle.
C.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The most pressing problems of public international law fragmentation concern conflicts
between functional sub-systems or branches of international law – trade and environment,
finance and human rights, etc. This is the context in which traditional intra-systemic
conflict rules have proven unsatisfactory. As noted earlier, the mechanical lex posterior
rule does not work well for conflicts between EU and WTO law or between GATT and
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multilateral environmental treaties and leads to surprising and often unconvincing results.
The same is often true with respect to the lex specialis principle: how is one to decide
whether, for example, a restriction on trade in an endangered species is more specifically
covered by a WTO rule (as a trade matter) or by a CITES provision (as an environmental
matter), given that no neutral higher authority exists to make this decision? And should
treaty parties be able to undermine their WTO obligations merely by formulating a
specific rule? This is, in our view, in no small measure due to the fact that this type of
conflict is more akin to inter-systemic conflict for which intra-systemic conflict rules
such as lex posterior and lex specialis were not designed.
There are two reasons why intra-systemic rules may be inadequate. The first is
that the fiction of the unitary lawmaker, a prerequisite of these rules as we saw earlier,
becomes increasingly implausible in the modern context of highly specialized, functional
regimes. International trade, investment, environment and human rights law, each with
their own international institution and/or club of negotiators, enforcement mechanisms,
epistemic communities, related national ministries, NGOs and even academics, make it
increasingly difficult to assume a unitary lawmaker with a sufficient sense of institutional
coherence, continuity and memory across these different branches.

As a result,

application of the intra-systemic rules of lex superior, lex posterior or lex specialis and
the related quest for the genuine intent of international law’s ‘unitary lawmaker’ have
become increasingly strenuous. 53 This raises the obvious question whether and when to
shift from such conflict-of-norms rules to conflict-of-laws rules.
The second reason, related to the first, is that when it comes to tensions between
branches of international law it becomes difficult to devise a neutral perspective from
which neutral conflict solutions could be formulated. Instead, each branch typically has
its own rules or perspective for dealing with conflicts, and these rules or starting points
often differ. For example, as noted earlier, there may be little point in trying to define the
lex specialis in the interaction between trade agreements and environmental agreements:
from the perspective of the trade agreement, the trade rule will be more specific (as in
‘trade in’ environmentally sensitive goods); from the viewpoint of the environmental
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treaty, the environmental rule will be more specific (as in ‘environmental concerns’
related to trade).
Sometimes, this neutrality problem becomes explicit in the text of conventions.
GATT Article XXIV, for example, states that regional trade agreements such as NAFTA
are subject to certain GATT principles, thereby setting up the GATT as lex superior.
Article 103 of NAFTA, in contrast, explicitly states that in the event of conflict between
GATT and NAFTA, NAFTA prevails. A similar tension exists between Article 103 of the
UN Charter, setting up Charter obligations as leges superiores, and the WTO rule that
WTO panels may not ‘add to or diminish’ from WTO covered agreements which some
have read as a conflict rule defining WTO law as lex superior. 54 Other examples
illustrating the problematic nature of lex superior in inter-systemic type conflicts
encompass interactions between UN and EC treaties, EC law and the European
Convention on Human Rights, UNCLOS and WTO law, etc. The problem of applying
lex superior in this context is reminiscent of the Yahoo! example discussed earlier and the
impossibility to establish a hierarchy between a French statute and a US constitutional
rule. 55
Sometimes, balancing is suggested as a solution. However, as discussed earlier,
balancing as a conflict rule may work well within a system but not between sub-systems
or branches of international law. If both international trade tribunals and environmental
tribunals each engage in rational balancing, in the absence of a common, objective
standard (available essentially only within a single ‘system’) the value judgments
involved in balancing are likely to lead to different results, depending on the values or
perspectives inherent in the trade system as opposed to the environmental system. For
example, when the WTO balances trade as against environmental protection under GATT
Article XX, the environment is set up as an exception for which the burden of proof rests
on the country attempting to protect the environment. In addition, environmental
measures may only trump trade liberalization rules in case they are ‘necessary’ and there
is no ‘less trade restrictive alternative’ available. Before an environmental tribunal, the
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opposite would likely be true, with, for example, environmental protection as the rule,
and trade liberalization as the exception.
This suggests that to the extent conflicts between sub-branches of international
law become more akin to inter-systemic conflicts, applying the intra-systemic conflict
rules of lex superior, lex specialis, lex posterior or balancing becomes more strenuous. If
scholars have clung to such rules nonetheless, the reason may well be their fear that the
alternative would be some unorganized legal pluralism. If it can be shown that intersystemic rules, if and where appropriately applied, can provide a certain degree of
coordination, such fears might be alleviated.
Here, we can only sketch some such possibilities. One would be to develop
private-international-law rules on the basis of connecting factors, except that these
connecting factors cannot be those of territory or personality (as in domestic intersystemic conflict rules) but must be functional, institutional and/or procedural connecting
factors pointing toward one branch of international law rather than the other (eg as the
‘proper law’). Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, who advocate a somewhat comparable
approach, argue that any solution of the conflict cannot result in an either/or decision but
must somehow combine aspects of both regimes, because most conflicts have relevant
effects within more than one sub-system. 56 But effects within more than one system are
characteristic of traditional private-international-law situations between states, too. In the
example from the Delaware court discussed earlier, 57 the claim for loss of consortium
undoubtedly has effects in both tort and family law, and in both Pennsylvania and
Delaware. Here, the goal is not to determine whether the issue is ‘really’ one of tort or
one of marriage law (it clearly touches on both), but instead which law is more
appropriately applied. Similarly, in international law, we would not ask whether an issue
‘really’ belongs to trade or environmental law, but rather, which regime is more
appropriate to be applied to the particular fact pattern. Applying the trade rather than the
environmental regime is not a simple preference of trade interests over environment
interest, but a preference of the decision in the trade regime on the role of environmental
concerns over the decision within the environmental regime on the role of trade. This is a
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question not confined to ‘true conflicts’; it is a question also where the different regimes
provide norms that are equivalent, in other words, the case of MSEN.
Arguably, this is what really goes on when international tribunals exercise the
jurisdiction to ‘interpret the submissions of the parties’ so as to ‘isolate the real issue in
the case and to identify the object of the claim’. 58 We can also find such a search for the
‘closest connection’ in the decision in Southern Bluefin Tuna. The tribunal in that case did
not think the conflict belonged only to one or the other regime, as ‘it is a commonplace of
international law and State Practice for more than one treaty to bear upon a particular
dispute.’ 59 Nonetheless, because the dispute was ‘centered’ in the 1993 Convention for
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, that Convention became the basis for the
decision. The tribunal did not deny that the conflict also ‘arose’ under UNCLOS. Rather,
it concluded that ‘[t]o find that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under
UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute that arose under the [1993 Convention]
would be artificial’. 60
Another example of an inter-systemic conflict rule operational in international law
can be derived from Article 22 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which
holds that
the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except
where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage
or threat to biological diversity. 61
The provision shows that the CBD does not claim absolute superiority over other treaties
(as noted earlier, in inter-systemic type conflicts this self-positioning as lex superior
would likely be futile). The CBD does claim priority only where a serious damage or
threat to biological diversity must be expected. This rule can be explained as an
application of the public policy exception. Article 22 does not resolve conflicts
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universally, because the competing treaty might simultaneously claim priority, but it does
provide a structure for addressing these conflicts from the perspective of one regime in a
way to minimize the conflict.
A different kind of hands-off-approach-within-limits for inter-systemic type
conflicts can be found in the now well-established Solange II approach to the interaction
between German constitutional law and EC law, as well as between the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Bosphorus
case. 62 Each of those regimes could have a legitimate claim to superiority; yet, as
discussed, when faced with inter-systemic conflicts, such claim risks having little effect.
Instead, a certain accommodation was found where each of these regimes or courts
recognized the other but added that where the encroachment becomes too serious,
superiority will be reclaimed–not with binding force for the other regime, but only by
each side for itself. Where the encroachment is not serious, there is a presumption of
equivalence among the different regimes (a case of MSEN) that facilitates deference.
Consider finally the Preamble of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 63 The
Preamble first invokes the principle of mutual support among trade and environment
agreements. Applying this principle, it maintains that the Protocol ‘shall not be
interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any
existing international agreements’, especially the WTO. However, in the very next
paragraph, we find that the Protocol is not subordinated to the WTO. This text displays a
desire to maintain intra-systemic coherence and consistency, and in its great abstraction
also shows the limits of such a desire. It may, at times, be more appropriate to treat the
conflict between trade and environment as one more akin to inter-systemic conflict. From
this perspective, the principle of mutual support could then be read as the principle of
comity which provides the historical basis for conflict of laws between states. Conflict of
laws has become much more refined; an invocation of comity is rarely necessary in view
of the fine-grained conflict-of-laws rules approaches we have. 64 A similar development
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may be more attractive for the relationship between trade and environment, instead of the
solutions centred in interpretation and hierarchical subordination, which the Protocol has
in mind, and which tend towards circularity.
D.

MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS

Finally, what does all of this mean for multi-sourced equivalent norms (MSEN)? In our
view, a method borrowed from conflict of laws appears particularly fruitful for MSEN,
because the problem addressed by MSEN is familiar in that field. MSEN have been
defined as rules that are ‘(1) binding upon the same international legal subjects; (2)
similar or identical in their normative content (in the words of the ILC, ‘“point in the
same direction”); and (3) have been established through different international
instruments or “legislative” procedures or are applicable in different substantive areas of
the law.’ 65 In focusing on rules that point in the same direction, they fill a gap left open
by the ILC Fragmentation Report that is addressed almost exclusively at rules pointing in
different directions. 66 This distinction between rules pointing in different directions and
rules pointing in the same direction is discussed, in governmental interest analysis
(explained earlier), as the distinction between true and false conflicts. True conflicts
describe situations in which the policies of different states are in conflict. (This definition
is in accordance with more recent definitions of conflict in international law, which go
beyond rules that cannot be obeyed at the same time and include rules that pursue
different goals.) 67 False conflicts, by contrast, describe situations in which either only one
of the two policies is implicated, or–and this makes for the parallel with MSENs –where
the policies of both states or of both regimes are congruent. 68 The typical solution is then
for the court to apply forum law.
MSEN exist both within and between sub-systems of international law. For
example, ‘national treatment’ as a MSEN can be found in the WTO and in NAFTA,
spread across the branches of trade and investment law. At the same time, national
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treatment is also sprinkled as a principle in various WTO agreements within the WTO
regime. Equivalent rules on the use of force, as addressed in the Nicaragua case, 69 are set
out in custom and in treaties, within the same ‘system’ or in the intra-systemic interaction
between general international law and treaties defined earlier. In the context of
investment arbitration, similar principles may be set out in an investment contract under
domestic law as well as in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) under international law,
that is, across the national and international ‘systems’. Yet, we submit that the problem
dealt with under the title of conflict of norms or conflict of laws is structurally capable of
accounting at least for some types of MSEN as well.
One example for the treatment of MSEN can be found in Art. 189.4(a)-(c) of the
EC Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA): 70
(a) When a Party seeks redress of a violation of an obligation under the WTO
Agreement, it shall have recourse to the relevant rules and procedures of the WTO
Agreement, which apply notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement.
(b) When a Party seeks redress of a violation of an obligation under this Part of
the Agreement, it shall have recourse to the rules and procedures of this Title.
(c) Unless the Parties otherwise agree, when a Party seeks redress of a violation of
an obligation under this Part of the Agreement which is equivalent in substance to
an obligation under the WTO, it shall have recourse to the relevant rules and
procedures of the WTO Agreement, which apply notwithstanding the provisions
of this Agreement.
The rule seems to have been written under the assumption of a relation of
hierarchy vis-à-vis the WTO. Such a relation is not necessary, as the example of NAFTAWTO showed. And indeed, rules 4(a) and 4(b) display a strong sense of an inter-systemic
approach more prone to conflict-of-laws rules than conflict-of-norms rules. Thus, both
Articles 4(a) and 4(b) base the applicable law on the close connection between
obligations under a Treaty and the rules and procedures connected with them, an
approach in tune with the traditional method of conflict of laws that designate entire legal
systems, not just individual norms, to apply.
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The most interesting provision in this context, however, is Art. 4(c) of the FTA
with its special regime for MSEN. Here, the otherwise necessary connection between
rule and context is given up. Instead, the provision adopts an approach comparable to
governmental interest analysis of laws, where the situation described would be viewed as
a false conflict: not a situation in which only one regime is interested in the application of
its law, but a situation in which the application of one law in fact furthers the interests of
the other regime as well. Under governmental interest analysis, such situations are
typically resolved in favour of forum law: New York is free to apply its own wrongful
death statute if doing so furthers also the policies of Massachusetts. Here, the resolution
is in favour of the rules of the WTO, but structurally this is not different. In both cases,
one law–forum law in the domestic conflict-of-laws analysis, WTO law in the WTO-FTA
context – is presumably applicable, but under certain conditions, in particular a difference
in the relevant policies, a deviation can be justified.
This example suggests more generally that, at least for some types of MSEN, a
conflict-of-laws approach may be appropriate. The idea that equivalent rules exist in
different regimes (such as national treatment in the WTO and Chile-EU FTA) is familiar
from an inter-systemic context, namely from comparative law: in comparative law, the
functional method presumes that different legal systems will contain if not similar then at
least functionally equivalent rules (eg on contracts or tort), because each legal system is
internally complete and thus needs to respond to essentially the same challenges as every
other legal system. 71 Both French and English law have rules dealing with questions of
enforcing contractual consensus; the question in conflict of laws is which of the two is
applicable. The same situation occurs in international law, for example, as between
NAFTA and the WTO, or the Chile-EU FTA and the WTO: both aim at resolving,
essentially, the same challenges (in this case, nationality-based discrimination in an
economic context). They contain MSENs because they are not perfectly integrated. Thus,
to the extent international law develops more or less complete regimes in parallel (albeit
centred on limited principles such as national treatment or non-discrimination), a conflict71

See Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’, in M Reimann & R Zimmermann
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 339, 367-72;
for criticism of this assumption, see, eg, Julie de Coninck, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law:
Quo Vadis?’ (2010) 74 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht Issue 2
(forthcoming) and the response by Michaels ibid.

of-laws approach seems most promising. This is the link between MSEN, the general
topic of this volume, and the conflict-of-laws alternative, suggested in this chapter.

V.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: IS INTERNATIONAL LAW A

SYSTEM?
So far, we have deliberately discussed the technical question – the respective adequacy of
different sets of rules for different types of public international law conflicts – without
addressing the ontological question whether international law is a system. The result has
been that international law can actually borrow rules from both, and that different sets of
rules are better for different types of conflicts. This means that the normative implications
of whether international law is a system are actually not that great. Nonetheless, the
question remains relevant, and some implications emerge from our analysis.
One tendency seems to be this: interactions between treaty-regimes (eg the WTO)
and general international law (eg the law of treaties or state responsibility) are better
resolved with rules made for intra-systemic conflicts and relate to international law as a
‘system’. Similarly, conflicts within branches of international law, for example within the
WTO treaty, appear to benefit from intra-systemic rules and thereby suggest that it makes
sense to conceive of the WTO as a (sub-)system.
In contrast, for interactions between specialized treaty regimes (say,
environmental law versus trade law), traditional intra-systemic rules do not always
provide satisfactory frameworks for analysis. However, as we demonstrate above, this
emergence of different sub-systems or legal pluralism need not result in anarchy. Rather,
coordination between these branches or sub-systems can occur, albeit imperfectly,
through inter-systemic conflict-of-laws rules. This suggests that in these aspects
international law is better seen as an unsystematic plurality of systems or regimes,
without the need of conceiving these systems as self-contained.
What does this mean for the question whether international law is a system or not?
First, we have seen that the question is far less important than the drafters of the ILC
Fragmentation Report appear to have thought, because the technical question – which set
of rules is adequate for which type of interaction between rules – can be answered

without recourse to this ontological question. Second, to the extent that the answers to the
technical question allow for conclusions, they suggest that it is useful to conceive of
international law as a system for some aspects and as the interaction of various systems in
others. It suggests that one set of conflicts rules – conflict-of-norms rules – is appropriate
for one set of conflicts, and another set of conflicts rules – conflict-of-laws rules – is
appropriate for the other. The criticism of international law as a system thus has it half
right: international law is not a full-fledged system, and traditional conflict-of-norms
rules are not always appropriate to resolve public international law conflicts. However,
this finding does not lead to anarchy but instead into another set of conflicts rules.
International law may, therefore, be a system at some level (in the sense, for
example, that all of its rules and branches interact and are governed by certain general
rules without there being so-called self-contained regimes 72 ), but a universe of different
systems, sub-systems or branches at another level (in the sense, for example, that rules
within the WTO treaty interact differently than a WTO rule interacts with the Kyoto
Protocol). The outcome is not chaos and anarchy but a more sophisticated legal
landscape, consequence of, to use the very title of the ILC Study Group, ‘the
diversification and expansion of international law’. Put differently, applying private
international law solutions to public international law conflicts – or recognizing that
certain conflicts of international law may be more akin to a conflict between Belgian and
German law than a conflict between one Belgian norm and another – need not mean the
end of international law.

On the contrary, it highlights the increased maturity and

complexity of international law and its unique, hybrid features as a sui generis type of
legal order.
If all of this is correct, then the first question for relations between international
law norms, or regimes, is neither whether international law is a system or not, nor which
norm or which regime should prevail, if any. The first question is which approach should
be used to resolve the conflict, that of conflict of norms or that of conflict of laws. This
question cannot and need not be determined with regard to an ontology of international
law; it must be established anew for many new conflicts. The dynamic and evolutionary
72
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character of international law makes it unlikely that the internal differentiation of
international law either is static or follows a predetermined path. The dependence of
international law on its actual practice suggests that how we resolve certain conflicts has
an effect on the very nature of these conflicts. How we resolve conflicts determines what
international law is. This is one more reason for why we should think hard before blindly
applying the conventional wisdom of conflict of norms. As international law diversifies
and matures, some public international law conflicts may well be best resolved through
private international law solutions. This chapter opens the way for such alternative
approach. Elaborating specific conflict-of-law rules for certain public international law
conflicts is the logical next step.

